INTRODUCTION
The textual guarantees of economic and social rights are saturated by standards. Using the example from international law, the right to "an adequate standard of living", 1 to "adequate food, clothing and housing", 2 to variously targeted levels of education, and to "the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health" 3 , which are to be "progressively realized" 4 subject to "maximum available resources", 5 all beg a kind of 297-300 (2015) . A focus on judicial methodology, rather than merely text and/or broader legal mobilization, is thus fruitful for economic and social rights. 2 ICESCR, art. 11. 3 Id., art. 11. 4 Id., art. 12. 5 Id., art 2(1).
rights. 19 An identified "new aspect of the principle of proportionality", 20 described in the context of the massive reduction of social welfare protections across Europe in the wake of the global financial crisis, delinks proportionality as principle and proportionality analysis as a structured doctrine, and connects the principle of proportionality within broader standards of reasonableness.
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between reasonableness review and proportionality within the context of economic and social rights. Both standards hew closely to the ideal of a "culture of justification". 21 Both too set out a measured assessment of the principle of proportionality, which we might summarize as the view that "the graver the impact of the decision upon the individual affected by it, the more substantial the justification that will be required." 22 Yet they do so under methodologies that are critically different. In outlining the differences of the two approaches, I present the developing approach to reasonableness review in South African constitutional law in Part I. The choice of this jurisdiction is pertinent as an early, sophisticated and influential 19 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 8(4)), G. The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other": ALEXY, supra note 6, at 102.
example of the reasonableness standard, which was forged by the court in the presence of both clearly enumerated and justiciable constitutional economic and social rights, and a structured limitations clause. 23 In Part II, I contrast this approach with proportionality analysis, which has been deployed in civil and political constitutional rights cases in South Africa, but far fewer economic and social rights cases. In Part III, I discuss a more direct integration of proportionality into reasonableness review, and suggest what is
gained, and what is lost, by this approach. A final question is whether reasonableness review, developed out of largely common law traditions, will travel as well as proportionality analysis purports to do.
I. REASONABLENESS REVIEW
The South African Constitution provides a useful case study in which to evaluate the connections between reasonableness, proportionality and economic and social rights. 35 That standard, which asked if the decision is so unreasonable that no decision maker could have made it, was a relaxed form of rationality review that could rarely defeat an administrative decision.
Over time, Wednesbury began to heighten in intensity, with the courts identifying a general rule that "the graver the impact of the decision upon the individual affected by it, the more substantial the justification that will be required." 36 Prior to the enactment of the . Thus, held Lord Steyn, while "most cases would be decided in the same way whichever approach is adopted", proportionality "may require the reviewing court to assess the balance which the decision-maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational and reasonable decisions"; and secondly, the test may go further than the assessment of relevant considerations, "inasmuch as it may require attention to be directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations". But it is the focus on the needs of the most vulnerable that links the approach to a conception of constitutional rights with due attention to those "whose needs are most urgent" 53 that directs our inquiry into its relationship with proportionality.
The target of this analysis is not the "discrete and insular minorities" 54 worthy of constitutional rights protection in the prominent U.S. model, which is based on a democratic justification of groups disproportionality underrepresented in political 48 
II. PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
Like reasonableness review, proportionality analysis provides a contextual standard for the judicial safeguarding of constitutional rights. Indeed, proportionality may be understood to be a subset of reasonableness -it has been counted among the leading manifestations of reasonableness in public law. 61 For example, the rationality behind the means-end analysis of an official decision or statute, that is part of the reasonableness inquiry, could not sustain a grossly disproportionate result. 62 Nonetheless, it is said to be proportionality analysis, rather than the principle of proportionality and its connection to 60 rationality, that has purportedly swept the world. 63 In this section, I provide a description of this test, and its limited application, so far, in economic and social rights adjudication.
First, it is perhaps surprising that proportionality analysis, in the standard three or fourstep variation that has been utilized by so many contemporary courts, 64 should be so absent from the adjudication of economic and social rights. If, in this era of "rights inflation", 65 we can talk about whether a right to feed pigeons exists, so too might it be expected that we can inquire about a right to secure a basic material existence -and about proportionality's method for operationalizing it. Of course, for economic and social rights, and particularly the positive obligations that flow from them, much turns on the question of resources and then on how to understand a kind of "best efforts" 66 institutional commitment in law. But if proportionality analysis is prescribed as the current answer to rights-induced juristocracy, due to its discipline and apparent consistency, 67 it is curious that it has had so little hold on the cases that raise the most persistent juristocratic fears. Yet, as will be shown in Part III below, the surprise relates only to the absence of proportionality analysis. The principle of proportionality, without the structured test, has found a home in economic and social rights adjudication. The reasonableness standard, which directs attention to the gravity of the need, and the vulnerability of the rights-holder, makes proportionality -as principle, but not as structured test -inseparable from reasonableness review.
In its most widely defended theoretical exposition, proportionality analysis asks the that prompted this migration, the test has both procedural and substantive appeal. Its chief German proponent, Robert Alexy, has provided a defense of proportionality analysis that argues that all rights can be optimized through the adoption of this assessment, rather than through a "firewall" of trumping or absolute protection. 72 Alexy's model of proportionality is critically important for economic and social rights, because it integrates the question as to how the state's duty to protect (as well as respect)
rights can be subject to disciplined balancing. 73 Nonetheless, despite the promise of this model for securing both the negative and the positive obligations that attach to economic and social rights, the deployment of the proportionality test has been largely asymmetrical in practice: it has mainly been reserved for "vertical" civil and political rights cases in their "negative" dimension. 74 In part, this is because of the asymmetrical protection of economic and social rights in the constitutions or treaty systems that are the Germany via Canada, provides that any prima facie violations of rights proceed through a multi-factored proportionality analysis. 79 The Constitutional Court, however, is not a strict adherent of the multipronged structure of the test: the Court considers the clause requires it to engage in "a balancing exercise and arrive at a global judgment on proportionality and not adhere mechanically to a sequential check-list". 80 Thus, while:
As a general rule, the more serious the impact of the measure on the right, the more persuasive or compelling the justification must be … the question is one of degree to be assessed in the concrete legislative and social setting of the measure, paying due regard to the means which are realistically available in our country at this stage, but without losing sight of the ultimate values to be protected.
81
At the necessity stage, the Court has held that "when giving appropriate effect to the factor of "less restrictive means", the court must not limit the range of legitimate legislative choice in a specific area." For the Court recognizes that "such legislative choice is influenced by considerations of cost, implementation, priorities of social demands, and the need to reconcile conflicting interests."
82
Such case law suggests that proportionality analysis has only loose appeal in other constitutional rights cases in South Africa, although the principle of proportionality itself is generally supported. And in only two economic and social rights cases -involving the right to housing and the right to social security -has the Court engaged in proportionality analysis. First, in Jaftha, the court held that where the state fails to honour its negative obligations with respect to the right to housing, the limitations analysis presented by s 36 rather than the reasonableness inquiry of s 26(2) should be considered. In that case, the Magistrates' Court Act's permission of a sale in execution of a person's home on the basis of failure to pay a "trifling debt" was held by the Constitutional Court to not be reasonable and justifiable, given the importance of access to adequate housing, its link to human dignity, the severity of the impact on indigent debtors, and the existence of less 81 Yet the Constitutional Court itself has declined to endorse any distinction between the two approaches. It is worth examining the differences in the approaches to proportionality analysis and reasonableness review.
III. DISTINGUISHING THE TWO APPROACHES
Proportionality and reasonableness may be analytically similar in the way they heighten the demand for justification according to the seriousness of the rights infringement; but their methodologies are critically distinct. There are three main differences: first, in the interpretation of the claimed right; second, in the approach to deference; and third, in the structuring of the limitation. These differences are outlined below, before turning to the question of how much turns on them, in actual practice.
A. The Content Inquiry
First, proportionality analysis and reasonableness review are distinct in the latitude they provide to judges in interpreting the claimed-for right. This is a consequential matter for economic and social rights, which are less developed, jurisprudentially, than their civil and political counterparts, highlighting a "paucity of normative resources on which the Court can draw in the interpretation of socio-economic rights or a clear purposive understanding of a transformative role of the Court in relation to socio-economic inequality".
87
Under proportionality analysis, the rights-granting clause is construed generously in favor of the claimant, who bears the onus of proving an infringement has occurred. Once made out, the onus of justification then shifts to the state. This general principle of construction accords readily with the observation of "rights-inflation" that is associated with proportionality more generally. In theory, a generous construction would lead to a broad acceptance of rights to access housing, health care, food, water, or education. One proponent of proportionality has suggested "the highest reasonable satisfaction" of the right in question could serve as the prima facie right. right that is separately articulated, before reasonableness is applied. 89 By integrating the analysis of a right's progressive realization, within the state's available resources, in the same step as defining the right, there is no standalone content, inflated or otherwise.
Thus, this form of review does little to outline the scope of the right, even while it may require proof from government that it has engaged in reasonable priority setting. Partly, this is because of the Court's insistence that it will not recognize a self-standing "minimum core" of economic and social rights. 90 But partly, this is due to the Court's reluctance to set any baseline entitlement or standard, outside of the legislative or common law context arising in each case. 91 This general approach is also compatible with the features of weak-form review applicable to South Africa, as elsewhere. (2); see further Iles, supra note 58. 90 See supra text accompanying note 57. 91 See, e.g., A.J. Van der Walt's suggested principle of "subsidiarity", which requires that "direct application of the Constitution and the application and development of the common law should only come up in the absence of legislation ….
[L]egislation either fails constitutional scrutiny or triggers a subsidiarity principle according to which the right must primarily be protected via the legislation and not via direct application of the constitutional provision or the common law: A.J. Van It is possible that the context-driven articulations of reasonableness can link the standard of review to the remedy. This is the case, for example, in doctrines such as "meaningful engagement" in the right to housing jurisprudence. The absence of a meaningful engagement between the parties, before an eviction, can point to the unreasonableness of government policy. But so, too, can meaningful engagement be prescribed as the remedy, 93 LIEBENBERG, supra note 31 at 175-76. 94 Bilchitz, supra note 57, at 143. 95 thus linking the two analyses, 96 in ways that may be less immediately obvious in proportionality analysis.
The divergence on the two approaches to interpreting the right becomes less sharp if one recognizes economic and social rights as principles, and there is nothing within the reasonableness assessment that prevents an open and broad statement of content before proceeding to the reasonableness inquiry. Nonetheless, the omission of this step has consequences for its placement of the burden of proof in rights adjudication. As a general matter, it is for the applicant to establish the breach of a fundamental right. Under proportionality analysis, the burden then shifts to the government to justify its prima facie infringement of the relevant right; 97 in reasonableness review, it may remain with the claimant, a not-insignificant barrier.
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These differing approaches to content are also distinct in relation to the minimum core idea. Certainly, reasonableness review may accommodate conceptions of a minimum threshold as one in a series of criteria that the Court will consider. 99 In contrast, the effect of the minimum core on the exercise of proportionality analysis is to minimize the right at both stages of the inquiry: in forming content and in justifying limitations. Although there is evidence of an effective operation of the minimum core and proportionality analysis in relation to economic and social rights in the Colombian context, 100 it is easy to theorize that the combination of approaches would both remove the inflationary effects of proportionality analysis at the expense of rights perhaps most in need of an inclusive, solidaristic expression, and deprive economic and social rights of operation in any but grave or catastrophic circumstances. Landau suggests that the Colombian Constitutional Court favors the vital minimum, or minimum core, as a concept in which to prioritize the interests of the poor, and proportionality analysis as a subsequent step in comparing the limitation with the government's justification. 101 Cf. Bernal, supra note 88. Using the Hartian vocabulary of cores and penumbras, Barak offers the view that proportionality should be applied to the full scope, but the core is a useful accompanying concept: BARAK, supra note 62, 20. 102 For an apt description of this general problem, see Michelman, supra note 66.
legislature's own balancing is worthy of respect. 108 But this is, of course, based on the assumption that the legislature has accorded due respect to economic and social rights, to which it is held democratically accountable -assumptions that may hold in the traditional welfare states, in so-called "normal" circumstances of stability and solidarity, but are far less tenable in conditions of fiscal disruption and crisis, ideological disagreement, legislative dysfunction, and internationally controlled fiscal policy -conditions which are far more likely to hold, in most places. 109 Given the inevitability of this dynamic, it is curious that proponents of proportionality have not reached a more developed position on where, when, and how, deference should be applied. 110 The correct level can depend, according to Mattias Kumm, on such broad factors as the political, social and cultural context; the complexity of the policy questions involved, the structure of the processes and institutions that have generated the decision that is under review, and the structure of the judicial institution. 111 Most of these factors would be weighted towards the adoption of deference in economic and social rights review. Even the negative obligations that flow from economic and social rights -such as obligations to desist from unlawful evictions, when homelessness may result -can raise issues of complexity, such as how, and in what form, alternative accommodation should be provided.
For Julian Rivers, the intensity of review can be shifted, between stronger and weaker, and more or less deferential forms of proportionality analysis, according to the "seriousness of the infringement" at issue. 112 But how is this seriousness to be determined by a court? Here, proportionality analysis runs out. For if courts do take economic and social rights seriously -and inquire into the dignity, equality, or freedom harms caused by the failure to secure basic needs or capabilities -then deference would immediately be put to one side, forcing the courts into a rigorous and searching proportionality analysis.
More likely, as current evidence suggests, courts will revert to recognizing "propertybased" or "equality" based assessments of seriousness, which are more cognizable to them, rather than attempt to accord due weight to the inevitable dignity harms that are experiencing by those living in poverty or other forms of vulnerability.
113
We might well accept judicial deference, via the margin of appreciation or other containment doctrines, or via the standard of reasonableness, under traditional separation of powers principles. There is much at stake in courts involving themselves in a highly charged balancing exercise, involving the complex weighting of principles of distributive justice, while maintaining a pragmatic grasp on their own legitimacy. Yet this dynamic does question the justification for proportionality analysis based on its purported disciplining effect. This is because if nothing within proportionality analysis dictates whether the court inquires more or less searchingly to the questions it asks at each stage, or how it should provide a margin of appreciation, then its claims to discipline and coherence are weakened. 114 The approach is then, in this respect, on par with the less explicit deference applied in reasonableness review.
115

C. The Structure of Limitations
Finally, the approaches to proportionality and reasonableness differ in their structuring of the limitation inquiry. As described above, proportionality analysis offers a disciplined, regimented, structured inquiry into the aims, necessity, (sometimes suitability) and proportionality of a limitation of a right. suitability and proportionality in an ad hoc method, which is arguably less restraining of the adjudicator's own views.
Again, the example of Mazibuko demonstrates the destructuring of the proportionality step within reasonableness review: in finding Johannesburg's water reforms to be reasonable, the court did not consider whether the City's objectives -"to reduce unaccounted for water, to rehabilitate the water network, to reduce water demand and to improve the rate of payment" 117 could have been pursued through other, less restrictive alternatives. For example, the Constitutional Court did not consider whether the City's objectives might have been achieved through installation of conventional credit meters (which would not result in automatic shutoffs); or whether a more generous quota applied overall would be more cost-effective than keeping an indigent person's register, given that the City's representative had indicated that the universalist system would be cheaper to administer. 118 In this respect, the structure of proportionality analysis might force the adjudicator to engage more explicitly with the more rights-respecting alternatives. So too may a more explicit adoption of the proportionality principle, without the requirement of deference.
IV. PROPORTIONALITY-INFLECTED REASONABLENESS?
117 society; 121 and even timing of jurisprudential development. 122 In the setting of economic and social rights, it is difference, rather than uniformity, that marks the comparative setting. 123 implementing its obligations. 125 Perhaps the Anglo-common law heritage of the standard helped to assuage the hostility of the main opponents of a complaints mechanism. 126 In outlining the scope of "reasonableness", the Committee has largely adopted the South African approach, including whether the steps have "taken into account the precarious situation of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or groups and, whether they were non-discriminatory, and whether they prioritized grave situations or situations of risk".
127
It has also made an explicit reference to proportionality, noting that it will consider to which extent, " where several policy options are available, the state party has adopted the option that least restricts Covenant rights". 128 The likely consolidation of national jurisprudence within the complaints mechanism will give greater migratory flight to the reasonableness standard for diverse constitutional systems. 129 the European setting, the links between reasonableness and integrated proportionality will no doubt continue. For example, in a letter to Member States addressing the global financial crisis, the Committee confirmed the "requirement" of proportionality, by calling for all policies confronting the crisis to "be necessary and proportionate, in the sense that the adoption of any other policy, or a failure to act, would be more detrimental to economic, social and cultural rights." 130 A proportionality-inflected standard of reasonableness may draw from the relevant examples from Europe, which include the Latvian Court's rejection of social security reforms made in the absence of "objective and well-weighted analysis" of the economic and social consequences of the reforms, and of other less restrictive means. 131 Similarly, in Hungary, among the Constitutional Court's earliest cases was a holding that the citizen's legitimate expectations and confidence in the legal system required a serious consideration of different means to social security reform, and not merely application of reforms "practically overnight". 132 A recent addition to this line of examples is the well-known rejection, by the German Constitutional Court, of cuts to social security reached by a random, rather than evidencebased, inquiry. 133 In other contexts, too, the requirement to give "reasonable consideration" to constitutional requirements may be more or less open to the principle of proportionality. 
Conclusion
The operation of proportionality is an asymmetrical one in the so-called "global model"
of constitutional rights -it is a test that has not been invoked in the prominent economic and social rights cases usually associated with this model. Partly, this is because the "margin of appreciation" that attends a proportionality inquiry is more likely to be triggered under present conceptions of economic and social rights. Nonetheless, the proportionality principle -that "the graver the impact of the decision upon the individual affected by it, the more substantial the justification that will be required" -inflects the standard of reasonableness that has been developed for economic and social rights adjudication. This paper suggests that the reasonableness standard, which follows a methodology of contextualized rights-evaluation, rather than the separate rightsidentification and justification-of-limits associated with the proportionality test, can nevertheless be both protective, and constraining, of justiciable rights. By avoiding the "containment" doctrines that can effectively remove all strength from a purportedly stronger intensity of review, the use of a proportionality-inflected reasonableness may yet deliver greater rights protection.
